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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Amanda Leann Skogen appeals from the judgment entered upon her 
guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Law enforcement responded to a report that three-year-old C.J. was 
unresponsive. (R., Vol. I, p.12.) When law enforcement arrived, Skogen, who 
was babysitting C.J., reported that C.J. "suddenly went limp and unconscious 
after urinating in his pants." (Id.) Skogen also claimed that C.J. had been 
complaining of a headache, seemed very tired, and had vomited that day, and he 
may have had the flu the previous week. (Id.) At the hospital, medical personnel 
determined C.J. had suffered two skull factures with internal bleeding and he was 
transported by air for immediate surgery. (R., Vol. I, pp.13, 18.) C.J. also had 
"multiple small bruises on this cheeks and jaw area" that "looked like they were 
caused by fingers," "bruising on his right ear as if someone had pulled on it as 
well as brownish bruises on his chest," and a "healing black eye on his right eye." 
(R., Vol. I, p.18.) 
During a subsequent interview, Skogen denied knowledge of how C.J. 
fractured his skull and agreed to take a polygraph. (R., Vol. I, pp.19-24.) Skogen 
failed the polygraph. (R., Vol. I, p.31.) When confronted with the polygraph 
results, Skogen initially continued to deny knowledge of how C.J. was injured, but 
eventually admitted she "pushed him." (R., Vol. I, p.33.) Skogen said she 
pushed C.J. because she was angry with him for wetting his pants and getting it 
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on her and her couch. (Id.) When Skogen pushed C.J., back and hit his 
head on the floor. (Id.) Skogen said she heard a "cracking noise" when this 
happened. (R., Vol. I, pp.33-34.) Skogen claimed she tried to revive C.J. by 
splashing water on his face and, when that was unsuccessful, she called 911. 
(R., Vol. I, p.34.) 
C.J. later died from his head injuries. (R., Vol. I, p.36.) The state charged 
Skogen with first-degree murder. (R., Vol. I, p.43.) After the preliminary hearing, 
the court declined to bind Skogen over on the charged offense and instead 
bound her over on involuntary manslaughter. (P.H. Tr., Vol. 2, p.298, Ls.16-25; 
p.299, Ls.14-15.) The state filed a motion to dismiss in which it sought to dismiss 
the case "in order to seek prosecution for the original charge of Murder in the 
First Degree." (R., Vol. II, p.300.) Before the court ruled on the state's motion, 
the parties reached an agreement whereby Skogen pied guilty to voluntary 
manslaughter with the state's sentencing recommendation limited to 15 years 
with eight years fixed. (R., Vol. II, pp.311-312, 316-317; Tr., p.7, L.10 - p.17, 
L.24.) Following a lengthy sentencing hearing, the court imposed a unified 13-
year sentence with four years fixed. (R., Vol. II, pp.476-480.) Skogen filed a 
Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. (R., Vol. 11, pp.496-497; Order 
filed July 18, 2011 (augmentation).) 
Skogen filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., Vol. II, pp.487-489.) 
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ISSUES 
Skogen states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 
prison sentence based on general deterrence and 
punishment alone. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed a unified sentence of thirteen years, with four years 
fixed, upon Ms. Skogen following her plea of guilty to 
voluntary manslaughter. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court decline to consider Skogen's claim that the 
district court abused its discretion by imposing sentence based on general 
deterrence since the claim was not raised below? Alternatively, does this Court 
lack authority to override the legislature's policy determination that sentence may 
be imposed based on such factors? 
2. Has Skogen failed to establish the district court abused its 
discretion in imposing a 13-year sentence, with four years fixed, upon Skogen 
following her guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter for the death of three-year-old 
C.J.? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Skogen's Claim That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing 
Sentence Based On General Deterrence Is Not Preserved; Alternatively, The 
Claim Should Be Reiected 
A. Introduction 
Skogen argues that "Idaho Courts should abandon the rule allowing for" 
sentences based on general deterrence because, according to Skogen, "the 
theory of general deterrence" is "fundamentally flawed." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
The Court should decline to consider this argument because it is not preserved. 
Alternatively, Skogen's argument must be rejected because, although this Court 
may declare a statute unconstitutional, the Court is not at liberty to instruct trial 
courts to "abandon" or ignore legislative enactments. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The test for determining whether a district court abused its discretion 
requires an appellate court to consider three factors: "(1) whether the court 
correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hanson, --- P.3d ----, 
2012 WL 29339 *3 (Idaho 2012) (quotations and citations omitted). 
The appellate court exercises free review over the application and 
construction of statutes. State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 191 P.3d 1098 
(2008); see also In Re Doe, 146 Idaho 277,284,192 P.3d 1101, 1108 (Ct. App. 
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2008) (citing State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 
2003)). 
C. The Court Should Decline To Consider Skogen's Claim That Sentence 
May Not Be Imposed Based On General Deterrence Because The Claim 
Is Not Preserved 
Skogen's appellate claim that a sentencing court should not be allowed to 
impose sentence based upon general deterrence was not presented to the 
district court. 1 "Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not 
preserved for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). Where a claim is raised for the first time on 
appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as 
fundamental error. J.sl at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Because Skogen did not present 
her claim that it is improper to impose sentence based on deterrence and 
punishment to the district court,2 and because she has failed to argue, much less 
1 Although Skogen argued that, in terms of general deterrence, the public only 
"knows the crime name and the sentence imposed" but does not "know the ins 
and outs of the cases" such that "a sentence of probation serves the same goal 
of deterrence" (Tr., p.253, L.18 - p.254, L.6), this is a vastly different argument 
than the one she makes on appeal that use of general deterrence alone is 
"fundamentally flawed." (Compare Appellant's Brief, pp.9-17). Moreover, as 
discussed in more detail in footnote 2, contrary to her claim on appeal, Skogen 
specifically acknowledged general deterrence was an appropriate factor to be 
considered on appeal. 
2 In fact, Skogen acknowledged at sentencing that deterrence and punishment 
are factors for the court to consider in imposing sentence, but argued those 
objectives, and all other sentencing objectives, were "satisfied and met with the 
probation sentence and suspended prison sentence." (Tr., p.248, Ls.6-13.) In 
that regard, Skogen invited the very error she claims on appeal and this Court 
should decline to consider her claim for this reason as well. State v. Blake, 133 
Idaho 237, 240, 985 P .2d 117, 120 ( 1999) (The purpose of the invited error 
doctrine is to prevent a party who "caused or played an important role in 
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establish, fundamental error by the district court in imposing sentence based on 
factors authorized by law, I.C. § 19-2521, this Court should decline to consider 
this claim. 
D. Even If The Court Considers Skogen's Claim That The District Court Erred 
In Imposing Sentence Based On General Deterrence, Skogen's Request 
For This Court To Authorize Abandonment Of Sentencing Considerations 
Authorized By Statute Must Be Reiected 
Skogen acknowledges that although, under Idaho law, "general 
deterrence alone can justify a prison sentence," this Court should "abandon" 
general deterrence as a valid sentencing factor because, she argues, "new 
research reveals that not only is the theory of general deterrence fundamentally 
flawed, but ... basing a punitive prison sentence on it alone actually increases 
the risk to society in the future."3 (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Skogen also argues 
that imposing punishment based on general deterrence is improper because, she 
prompting a trial court" to take a particular action from "later challenging that 
decision on appeal."); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. 
App. 2000) (A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from 
complaining that a ruling or action of the trial court that the party invited, 
consented to or acquiesced in was error; State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465, 
788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990) (invited doctrine applies to sentencing 
decisions as well as to rulings during trial). 
3 Although Skogen's issue statement asserts error in "imposing a prison 
sentence based on general deterrence and punishment alone" (Appellant's Brief, 
p.7 (emphasis added)), it appears she is really only arguing that imposing a 
sentence based solely on general deterrence is improper (see Appellant's Brief, 
pp.10-12). However, as discussed in more detail in Section ti, infra, the court did 
not impose sentence based solely on general deterrence. If anything, the court 
placed more emphasis on "punishment, or retribution" than it placed on general 
deterrence. (Tr., p.261, L.13 - p.262, L.9.) Thus, any assertion that the district 
court focused solely on general deterrence is erroneous. 
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contends, it undermines the objective of protecting society. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.16-18.) Skogen's arguments must be rejected. 
Idaho Code § 19-2521 sets forth criteria for a tria I court to consider when 
deciding whether to place a defendant on probation or impose imprisonment 
That section provides, in relevant part: 
(1) The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a 
crime without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having 
regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the 
history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion 
that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public 
because: 
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended 
sentence or probation the defendant will commit another crime; or 
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be 
provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or 
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the 
defendant's crime; or 
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and 
deterrent to the defendant; or 
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for 
other persons in the community; or 
(f) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminaL 
LC. § 19-2521 (1 )(e) (emphasis added). 
Skogen's arguments that general deterrence is a "fundamentally flawed" 
sentencing consideration and punishment based on general deterrence actually 
undermines the protection of society are based on articles by individuals who 
essentially proffer policy reasons why punishment based on general deterrence 
is ineffective and inappropriate. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-19.) This Court is not, 
7 
however, the body to decide whether these concerns warrant eliminating general 
deterrence and punishment as factors at sentencing; that task is one for the 
legislature based on policy considerations related to whether general deterrence 
can be achieved by individual sentences. See Idaho Schools for Equal 
Educational Opportunity v. State, 142 Idaho 450, 460, 129 P.3d 1199, 1209 
(2005) (recognizing that policy decisions are for the legislature, which decisions 
are "subject to our continuing responsibility to ensure Idaho's constitutional 
provisions are satisfied"); Plummer v. City of Fruitland, 140 Idaho 1, 4, 89 P.3d 
841, 844 (2003) ("policy decisions are left to the legislature"); Idaho State AFL-
C 10 v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691,698,718 P.2d 1129, 1136 (1986) (holding that in 
the absence of a legislative invasion of constitutionally-protected rights, the 
judicial branch of government must respect and defer to the legislature's 
exclusive policy decisions). 
Skogen's request that this Court disregard the laws passed by the 
legislature on policy grounds, if preserved, should be rejected. 
11. 
Skogen Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Imposing Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Skogen argues the district court abused its discretion in imposing 
sentence, asserting her sentence is excessive for several reasons: (1) her 
sentence "fails to promote" the general deterrence objective (Appellant's Brief, 
p.19); (2) the sentence was vindictive if imposed solely for "retribution" 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.20-21 ); (3) the district court "failed to sufficiently consider 
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several mitigating circumstances" (Appellant's Brief, p.21), and (4) the district 
"usurped a legislative function by creating a special class of punishments for 
babysitters" (Appellant's Brief, p.34). All of Skogen's arguments lack merit. 
Application of well-established sentencing standards to the facts presented to the 
district court reveals Skogen has failed to meet her heavy burden of establishing 
the district court abused its discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion." 
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, _, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and 
citations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its 
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ." !g__,_ 
C. Skogen Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
In Imposing Sentence 
"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness." 
Miller, 151 Idaho at _, 264 P.3d at 941 (quotations and citation omitted). 
"When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an 
independent examination of the record, "having regard to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest." 
!g__,_ A review of the record demonstrates that a 13-year sentence with four years 
fixed imposed for the death of a three-year-old child was more than reasonable. 
Skogen has failed to establish otherwise. 
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The four objectives of sentencing are well-established. They are "(1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) 
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution." State v. 
Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319-320, 144 P.3d 23, 24-25 (2006) (quotations and 
citations omitted). "A sentence need not serve all sentencing goals; one may be 
sufficient." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003) 
(citing State v. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 241, 804 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. App. 
1991 )). "[G]eneral deterrence is a sufficient basis for the imposition of a period of 
incarceration." State v. Robison, 119 Idaho 890, 893, 811 P.2d 500, 503 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (citations omitted). Sentence may also be imposed based upon the 
objective of punishment or retribution. See Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 285, 77 P.3d 
at 974; see also State v. Whittle, 145 Idaho 49, 175 P.3d 211 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(affirming ten-year sentence with eight years fixed on felony injury to child charge 
involving death of a child and noting "[t]he offense to which [defendant] pleaded 
is very grave"); State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776,777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. 
App. 1989) ("To the extent that a minimum period of confinement represents the 
judicially determined 'price' of a crime, the criteria of retribution and deterrence 
are particularly important.") 
In imposing sentence on Skogen, the district court considered all of the 
information before it, including the preliminary hearing transcript (Tr., p.69, L.8 -
p.70, L.20), as well as the objectives of sentencing and stated: 
Considering protection of society first, I don't believe that Ms. 
Skogen would commit such an act again. There's no way to say 
with all certainty, but I think Dr. Hayes's testimony that repeat of 
this action by her would be remote is the likely case. 
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Rehabilitation is a consideration. I think that, as [defense 
counsel] stated, certainly she's in need of counseling, as we have 
heard a lot of other people involved in this case certainly are as a 
result of the death of [C.J.]. 
Deterrence is a factor. Again, I don't think it's a situation of 
specific deterrence to Ms. Skogen. I think it's a factor for general 
deterrence to the public to know that there are consequences to 
actions that you are being held responsible for, Ms. Skogen. 
That really comes down to another factor, which is 
punishment. And punishment, or retribution, is an important factor 
because, as I stated earlier, there is a need to hold people 
accountable for their actions. 
(Tr., p.261, Ls.3-23.) 
On appeal, Skogen argues that "even if general deterrence is still an 
acceptable objective in sentencing," her sentence is excessive because, she 
asserts, it does not satisfy that objective. (Appellant's Brief, p.19 (capitalization 
altered).) According to Skogen, and the article from Crimonology on which she 
heavily relies, general deterrence requires the ability to "accurately predict the 
certainty, severity, and swiftness of punishment." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) 
Skogen contends her sentence "destroys the certainty of imprisonment" because 
defendants in other Kootenai County cases involving the death of a child 
received probation either outright or following a period of retained jurisdiction 
rather than prison. (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) Thus, Skogen concludes, 
"prospective offender[s] will not be deterred" because they will not know with 
certainty whether they will go to prison. (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) This argument 
is without merit. While the author of the article upon which Skogen relies may 
believe that effective general deterrence requires certainty in the exact penalty 
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that will be imposed (as opposed deterrence being accomplished by the 
possibility prison), neither the Idaho legislature nor the Idaho appellate courts 
have adopted this position. Indeed, Skogen's contention that certainty in 
sentencing is required is contrary to Idaho's entire discretionary sentencing 
model. Skogen's comparative sentencing argument is also contrary to Idaho 
precedent rejecting such an approach.4 As noted in State v. Pederson, 124 
Idaho 179, 183, 857 P.2d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 1993), comparative sentencing is 
not appropriate because: "It is well settled that not every offense in like category 
calls for identical punishment; there may properly be a variation in sentences 
between different offenders, depending on the circumstances of the crime and 
the character of the defendant in his or her individual case." (Citations omitted.) 
It is this very principle that allowed the district court to impose a sentence on 
Skogen that is less than the maximum authorized by law or less than a greater 
sentence imposed in a different case; presumably Skogen would prefer this to 
4 Skogen also asserts "it has already been established that more lenient 
sentences are appropriate in such situations," citing State v. Whittle, 145 Idaho 
49, 175 P.3d 211 (Ct. App. 2007). (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Whittle hardly 
stands for the proposition that "more lenient sentences are appropriate" when a 
child is killed. In fact, the Court in Whittle did not evaluate the propriety of 
suspending the defendant's ten-year sentence with eight years fixed. The Court 
only evaluated whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering that 
sentence executed, without reduction, afterthe defendant violated her probation. 
Whittle, 145 Idaho at 52, 175 P.3d at 214. If the Court in Whittle actually 
"established" that any particular sentence was appropriate, it was that the fixed 
eight-year sentence was, which is twice the fixed term Skogen received. Further, 
an appellate determination that a sentence is not excessive does not mean that a 
sentence greater than the one imposed in the case being reviewed is excessive. 
Any argument otherwise is specious. 
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the elimination of discretion altogether in order to advance her stated objective of 
"certainty" for the benefit of effectively deterring others. 
Finally, Skogen's argument, although couched as one that acknowledges 
general deterrence is an "acceptable objective in sentencing," is essentially a 
restatement of her argument that general deterrence should not be an objective 
at all. For the reasons already stated, this argument fails. 
Skogen next argues that because general deterrence is not achieved by 
the sentence imposed upon her, the only "rationale remaining for a prison 
sentence is retribution," "[e]rgo, it is a vengeful sentence, and is thus excessive 
and was imposed in an abuse of discretion." (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-21.) This 
argument fails for several reasons. First, for the reasons set forth above, the 
assertion that general deterrence is not achieved lacks merit. Second, 
punishment or retribution is a valid sentencing objective and sentence may be 
imposed on this basis alone. See Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 285, 77 P .3d at 974; 
Whittle, 145 Idaho 49, 175 P.3d 211; I.C. § 19-2521 (1 )(c) (imprisonment 
appropriate where "[aJ lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the 
defendant's crime"). Third, "a vengeful sentence" is not one imposed based on 
the objective of punishment and Skogen's reliance on State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 
61, 72,951 P.2d 1288, 1299 (Ct. App. 1998), for such a proposition is completely 
improper. A vindictive sentence is one imposed to punish a defendant for 
exercising her rights. This is the principle stated in Brown and it clearly does not 
apply to this case. 
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Skogen also argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion 
by "fail[ing] to sufficiently consider several mitigating circumstances." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.21.) Specifically, Skogen complains that the district court 
improperly "determined" that Skogen's initial lies about what happened to C.J. 
"was an aggregating [sic] factor." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) Skogen argues "a 
sufficient consideration ... requires a sufficient consideration as to the reasons 
for the reaction," which according to Skogen's psychological evaluator was the 
result of Skogen's difficulty "com[ingJ to terms with the event" and her inability to 
"articulate what happened and why." (Appellant's Brief, pp.21-23.) Contrary to 
Skogen's claim, "sufficient consideration" does not mean the court is required to 
accept her explanations for her behavior or her characterizations of evidence as 
mitigating rather than aggravating. See Miller, 151 Idaho at---, 264 P.3d at 943 
(implicitly approving district court's decision declining to view substance abuse 
and family support as mitigating); Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 971 (9th Cir. 
2002) (quoting Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 943 (9th Cir. 1998)) (While a 
sentencing judge is required to give consideration and effect to evidence 
presented by the defendant, the court is not required to give particular weight to 
the evidence presented by the defendant or even find it is mitigating.). Skogen's 
argument that she finally told the truth about what happened once she was "able 
to reconcile her actions with her perspective of her character" (Appellant's Brief, 
p.25), is also contradicted by the fact that she only disclosed after being 
confronted with the fact she failed her polygraph (R., Vol. I, p.33). The district 
court acted well within its discretion in viewing Skogen's initial lies, and the 
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related scrutiny of C.J.'s parents that resulted from those lies, 5 as a negative 
factor, rather than a "mitigating" one. (Tr., p.260, Ls.1-19.) 
Finally, and ironically in light of her argument that the district court erred in 
considering general deterrence as a sentencing objective, Skogen argues that 
the district court "usurped a legislative function by creating a special class of 
punishments for babysitters."6 (Appellant's Brief, p.34.) This argument is 
premised on the elements of voluntary manslaughter which, Skogen notes, 
includes "no special provision for babysitters, or even those entrusted to care for 
another's child." (Appellant's Brief, p.35.) The elements of voluntary 
manslaughter are irrelevant to whether the court can consider Skogen's role as a 
caregiver, in a position of trust, which she violated by abusing C.J. "It is 
fundamental that a sentencing court may properly conduct an inquiry broad in 
scope, largely unlimited, either as to the kind of information it may consider or the 
source from which it may come." State v. Leon, 142 Idaho 705, 709, 132 P .3d 
462, 466 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). Skogen's relationship to C.J. at the 
time she caused his death is exactly the type of information that informs a 
5 Skogen also asserts that the district court's concern regarding the scrutiny of 
C.J.'s parents resulting from Skogen's initial lies is a "clearly erroneous" "finding" 
because she told law enforcement that she did not think C.J.'s parents were 
abusive. (Appellant's Brief, pp.26-27.) This argument borders on absurd. 
Skogen cannot seriously dispute that her statements that C.J. just went limp 
were among the reasons C.J.'s parents were investigated for potential child 
abuse when C.J. was taken to the hospital and medical personnel concluded he 
had been abused. The fact that she told law enforcement that she did not think 
C.J.'s parents would abuse him in no way mitigated the scrutiny they underwent 
as a result of her failure to be forthcoming. 
6 At sentencing, the court stated: "There's certainly an aggravating factor here in 
that, Ms. Skogen, you were a baby-sitter of young [C.J.]. You were in a position 
of trust, and you abused that trust." (Tr., p.259, Ls.19-22.) 
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sentencing court's consideration of the objectives of sentencing, the nature of the 
offense, and the character of the offender. Skogen's claim that consideration of 
such information represented a usurpation of legislative authority is meritless. 
The district court in this case, applying longstanding and accepted 
sentencing standards, acted well within its discretion in imposing a unified 13-
year sentence with four years fixed upon Skogen's guilty plea to the voluntary 
manslaughter of three-year-old C.J. As aptly noted by the district court, a lesser 
sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. (Tr., p.262, Ls.7-9.) 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentence entered upon Skogen's guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter. 
DATED this 4th day of April, 2012. 
JltSSI A M. LORELLO 
i D~put Attorney General 
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